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Abstract In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), prove-
nance records the data source, forwarding, and aggregating
information of data packets on their way to the base station.
Provenance is critical for assessing the trustworthiness of
the received data, diagnosing network failures, detecting
early signs of attacks, etc. However, because the prove-
nance size expands rapidly with the increase in packet
transmission hops, the provenance schemes developed for
use in wired computer networks are not generally appli-
cable to WSNs. Therefore, specific provenance techniques
have been developed for WSNs that take into account the
constrained resources of sensor nodes. In this paper, we
survey such techniques. Special focus in the paper is
devoted to a systematic and comprehensive classification
of the solutions proposed in the literature. We review each
solution by highlighting its pros and cons. Finally, we
discuss recent trends in provenance encoding schemes for
WSNs.
Keywords Data provenance  Data trustworthiness 
Wireless sensor networks
1 Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a number of
small and low-cost sensor nodes (nodes, for short). Each
node basically has sensing, and data processing and com-
municating capabilities. WSNs play an important role in
data acquisition and transmission for many application
domains which use different types of sensors, such as
magnetic, thermal, infrared, acoustic, and radar. Compared
to the wired computer networks, the nodes of WSNs are
often resource-tightened and deployed in unprotected
physical environments. Moreover, communications in
WSNs depend on multi-hop wireless signal relays. Because
of such characteristics, data transmitted across WSNs can
be easily tampered. As a result, in order to reliably use data
collected from a WSN assessing the trustworthiness of the
collected data is critical. Provenance is a key factor for
assessing data trustworthiness as provenance records the
history of data acquisition and ownership, and the actions
performed on the data while being processed and trans-
mitted across the WSN.
The notion of provenance had been originally intro-
duced to document the origin, history, chain of custody,
derivation, or process of art objects. When we use prove-
nance in the field of information technology, the dual of the
art object is the data. Usually, when data item is processed
and transmitted across large-scale systems, the provenance
size may largely exceeds the size of the data themselves;
for example, Jayapandian et al. report that in the MiMI
system, for data with size of 270 MB, the provenance for
the data is approximately equal to 6 GB [12]. Therefore, in
order to limit the provenance size, different provenance
systems retain only certain provenance information. In the
context of WSNs, the provenance of a data packet refers to
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forwarded and/or aggregated, to the base station (BS) [14].
It is important to notice that in WSNs provenance is useful
not only for data trustworthiness assessment, but also for
network’s troubleshooting.
In a multi-hop WSN, even if the provenance of an
individual data packet (packet, for short) only records the
trace of the packet, the provenance size rapidly increases
with the increase in the number of packet transmission
hops. Therefore, provenance schemes for wired computer
networks, e.g., [9, 31, 32], are not generally applicable to
WSNs. In order to address the limited processing capabil-
ities and limited wireless communication bandwidth at
each node, several compact, or lightweight, data prove-
nance schemes have been proposed. The goal of this paper
is to provide a deeper understanding of current provenance
schemes in WSNs, and to identify open research issues that
can be further pursued in this area.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2
introduces the system model and basic concepts used in
this paper. Section 3 classifies existing provenance
schemes into five different categories and then reviews
each of them. Section 4 summarizes security issues related
to provenance encoding and transmission in WSNs. Sec-
tion 5 discusses recent trends and research directions in
provenance schemes for WSNs, and Sect. 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Background
In this section, we introduce the WSN model we use
throughout the discussion and the WSN provenance models
considered in this paper. We also briefly discuss the main
challenges in designing and implementing provenance
schemes for WSNs.
2.1 Network Model for WSNs
The network model we consider in this paper is that of a
multi-hop WSN, consisting of a number of nodes and a BS
that collects data from the nodes by rounds.
A round is a time interval, in which the sensors attached
to the nodes generate data and then transmit the data to the
BS. The use of the rounds reduces the waking time for the
nodes and therefore extends the batteries lifetime. For
instance, using a TelosB node the average waking and
sleeping power consumptions are 3 mW and 225 lW,
respectively [29], i.e., in an awake node, even when not
transmitting wireless signals, the energy consumption is
about 13 times greater than that of a sleeping node.
Each node has a unique identifier nID and a symmetric
cryptographic key kID assigned by the BS. The key kID is
used to bind the data and its provenance as well as to
encrypt the sensitive data. The BS is a node directly con-
nected to a server, and therefore compared to the other
nodes, it does not have constraints with respect to energy,
storage space and computational capabilities.
Every node, except the BS, has three possible roles: data
source, data forwarder and data aggregator. A data source
acquires data through the sensors connected to the node and
then sends the data in the form of a packet. A data forwarder
relays the received packet toward the BS. A data aggregator
aggregates two or more smaller packets into a new large
packet and then sends the new packet toward the BS [23].
The most important advantage of packets aggregation is to
save energy, i.e., when two or more packets are aggregated,
the energy required for transmitting the aggregated packet is
lower than the energy required for transmitting those
packets independently [1]. Nowadays, most WSN trans-
mission protocols support packet aggregation. Any node
can be a data aggregator when the aggregation conditions
hold during packet transmission [8].
Because packet path loops are prohibited by all practical
WSN transmission protocols, formally the network model
of a WSN is an acyclic directed graph G(N, E), where
N ¼ fnij1 i jNjg is the set of nodes, and E ¼
feijj1 i; j jNjg is the set of directed edges between
nodes. |N| denotes the cardinality of set N and eij denotes
the directed edge from ni to nj.
2.2 A Provenance Model for WSNs
The definition of data provenance varies with different
application domains. In the context of WSNs, the prove-
nance of a data item refers to where the item is produced
and how it is delivered, e.g., forwarded and/or aggregated,
to the BS [14]. Therefore, the formal model for the data
provenance in WSNs is as follows [22, 27]:
For a WSN G(N, E), let p be a packet delivered to the
BS. The provenance of p is defined as a directed acyclic
graph TðV ;EÞp, where a vertex v 2 V is the ID of a node
that has generated or forwarded or aggregated p with an
unique sequence number seq. For simplicity, the notation
ðnID; seqÞ is used to represent v in the provenance of p. The
notation HostðvÞ denotes the host node’s ID of v, i.e., the
first element of the pair representing v, that is, v:nID. An
edge eij 2 E represents the one hop packet transmission
from node HostðviÞ to node HostðvjÞ, where vi; vj 2 V .
It is worth noting that such a definition is a node-level
provenance which encodes the nodes involved at each step
of data processing. Each node in the provenance graph
represents a snapshot of a packet passing by a sensor node.
As a result, each packet has an independent provenance
graph. The mapping from any node in the provenance
graphs to a node in the WSN is single-valued, whereas
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from a WSN node to a node in the provenance graphs the
mapping is multi-valued. Moreover, as the provenance
graphs are derived from the WSNs’ topology graphs, they
are acyclic directed graphs too.
Figure 1 [27] shows two different kinds of provenances;
in the figure n1 serves as the BS. In Fig. 1a, the data item is
generated at leaf node n3 and the nodes in the middle
simply forward the data to the BS. Such a provenance is
referred as a simple or linear provenance. In Fig. 1b, the
data item is aggregated and forwarded toward the BS,
where n4 aggregates the packets from n6 and n7, and n3
aggregates the packets from n4 and n8, respectively. Such a
provenance is referred as an aggregated or tree-like
provenance. Note that the aggregated provenance reuses
some packet paths, and therefore the length of the aggre-
gated provenance is shorter than the sum of the lengths of
the provenances that one would have when transmitting
those packets from each data source to the BS
independently.
Since a packet usually keeps its sequence number seq in
the packet’s head, to save energy, most provenance
schemes simply transmit node IDs in the provenance. At
the BS, the provenance is obtained by combining the
received node IDs and seq together.
2.3 Challenges
Although several data provenance techniques have been
proposed over the years, research on the provenance
techniques for WSNs is a relative new research topic.
Existing provenance schemes developed for conventional
wired networks cannot be applied to WSNs without being
modified due to both the resource-tightened nature of
WSNs and the rapid provenance size increase.
These designs of provenance schemes for WSNs
requires addressing several challenges.
(1) Large-scale and wireless signal relays. When using
wireless signals, the relationship between the trans-
mitted power P and the transmitted distance d is
P / dn, where 3 n 4. Thus, doubling the trans-
mission distance d requires increasing the transmis-
sion power from 8 to 16 times [29]. To save energy,
the wireless transmission range of a node is from a
few meters to a few hundred meters. Subsequently,
even for monitoring areas of moderate size, large
amounts of nodes are needed. As a result, packet
transmission usually requires a large number of
wireless signal relay hops, which increases the
provenance’s size.
Using the internet, to send a packet from Shanghai to
Chicago that are at a distance of about 8,000 miles,
only 11 hops are required on average, whereas
sending a packet in a WSN to cross 1 mile may
require from 10 to 20 hops when using Zigbee nodes.
(2) Limited or no infrastructure. In a WSN, no global IP
address is available. Each node only has an ID
assigned by the BS according to the transmission
protocol adopted in the WSN. Nodes are stationary
after deployment, but routing paths may change over
time due to node failures, link quality degradation,
and resource optimization [27]. Furthermore, nodes
are deployed in an ad hoc or, rarely, in a pre-planned
manner. Once deployed, the WSN is often left
unattended to perform monitoring functions. Gener-
ally, a node ID does not contain any location
information for the node; thus, network maintenance
activities, such as managing connectivity and detect-
ing failures, are difficult.
(3) Limited data processing abilities. Most nodes
deployed in today WSNs have less than 10 KB
memory, and an 8-bit or 16-bit processor with
frequencies from 4 to 7.37 MHz. Generally, the
power consumption of a desktop computer is
between 200 and 300 W, whereas the power
consumption for a TelosB node is only 3 mW [29].
In view of this, most provenance schemes developed
for conventional computing systems cannot be
applied to WSNs due to the limited computing
capabilities of nodes.
3 Provenance Schemes
We classify the known provenance schemes for WSNs into
the following categories: elementary schemes, distributed
schemes, block schemes, lossy compression schemes, and
(a) (b)
Fig. 1 Examples of provenance graphs, where n1 represents the BS;
a simple provenance; b aggregated provenance
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lossless compression schemes. In what follows, we review
each category and highlight its pros and cons.
3.1 Elementary Provenance Schemes
Elementary provenance schemes satisfy the basic prove-
nance requirements for WSNs, but are not suitable for the
resource-tightened nature of nodes.
3.1.1 SPS
In the SPS (Generic Secure Provenance) scheme [10], the
provenance of a node with respect to a data item Di is
encoded as Pi ¼ hni; hashðDiÞ;Cii, where ni is the node ID;
hashðDiÞ is a cryptographic hash of the data item Di;
Ci ¼ fhashðni; hashðDiÞkCi1Þgki , i.e., Ci is a hash value
signed by ni with its encryption key ki.
Under the SPS scheme, as each node in the packet path
appends its provenance information to the current prove-
nance, the size of the provenance increases linearly. Assume
that the node ID is 2 bytes, if we use SHA-1 (160 bits) for the
cryptographic hash operation and the TinyECC library [15]
to generate the signature with the length of 160 bits, the
provenance size’s increase at each hop is of 42 bytes.
3.1.2 MP
In the MP (MAC based Provenance) scheme [22], a node
uses its ID and a CBC-MAC (cipher block chaining mes-
sage authentication code) together as the provenance. The
CBC-MAC is a chain of blocks, except that the first block
at the data source has an initial value, where every block’s
generation depends on its previous block and the current
node’s ID in the packet path. Because of such interde-
pendence, any block change causes the final block to
change in a way that cannot be predicted without knowing
all the encryption keys used at the node where the change
has occurred and at all the subsequent nodes.
Under the MP scheme, assume that the node ID is 2
bytes. When we use the TinySec library [13] to compute a
4-byte CBC-MAC, the provenance size increases by 6
bytes linearly at each hop.
3.1.3 Pros and Cons
To the best of our knowledge, the elementary prove-
nance schemes are the simplest and easiest ones to
implement in WSNs when compared to the other
provenance schemes. Their disadvantage is that their
average provenance size expand too fasts, even in mid-
dle-scale WSNs, thus making unaffordable the prove-
nance transmission cost.
3.2 Distributed Provenance Schemes
Distributed provenance schemes use a distributed approach
for storing provenance information on a series of nodes in a
WSN. When the BS requires the provenance of a received
data item, it has to send a query to the entire network and
then retrieve the provenance by combining the responses
from those nodes which have provenance information for
the queried data item.
3.2.1 CAPTRA
CAPTRA (Coordinated Packet Traceback) [25] is a typical
distributed provenance scheme. Under the CAPTRA
scheme, when a node ni sends a packet p to nj, such
information is not only recorded by ni and nj, but by the
nearby nodes too. All nodes use the Bloom Filter [19] data
structure to compactly store such provenance and prove-
nance witness information. The provenance information is
stored at the nodes in the packet path; the provenance
witness information is recorded by the nearby nodes who
have witnessed the packet transmission at some nodes in
the packet path.
When the BS needs to retrieve the provenance of a
received packet, it requires the WSN to determine the
nodes that were in the packet path. The BS trusts self-
claimed information from a node that it was in the packet
path if and only if the number of the witness nodes which
supporting such self-claimed information is greater than a
value K, where K 2 Nþ is a preset empirical value.
3.2.2 CTrace
CTrace (Contact-based traceback) [30] is another dis-
tributed provenance scheme in which each node uses its
contact nodes within R hops and the PPM (Probabilistic
Packet Marking) [9] approach to encode provenance. At a
node ni, for each arrived packet p, if p has been marked by
the contacts of ni, ni will generate a digest for p using a
hash function and then store the digest and the ID of p to-
gether. Furthermore, if the PPM condition holds (viz., upon
reception of p, ni generates a random number r, and r is
less than a preset empirical value v), ni will add its ID to
the provenance of p. If p has not been marked by the
contacts of ni, ni will add its ID to the provenance of p and
then send it to the next node.
When the BS wants to retrieve the provenance of a
received packet p, the BS will send a query to one of its
contact nodes nx, and then the packet path of p from nx to
the BS is reconstructed by combining the provenance
information from the contact nodes of nx. Subsequently, nx
will send the same query to one of its contact nodes ny, and
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then the packet path of p from ny to nx is reconstructed
similarly. Such a query stops when the data source node of
the packet path of p is found.
3.2.3 Pros and Cons
The distributed provenance schemes spread the provenance
information on the nodes along the packet path from the
data source node to the BS. As a result, the BS does not
receive the entire provenance information together with the
corresponding received packet. The advantages of the
distributed provenance schemes include both energy and
wireless bandwidth savings because of the limited prove-
nance information attached to every packet. The disad-
vantage of the distributed provenance schemes is that
provenance decoding is not robust. Compromised nodes
and link degradations, which are normal events in WSNs,
may cause provenance decoding failures.
3.3 Block Provenance Schemes
Block provenance schemes partition the provenance into a
series of blocks, and then each packet only carries with it
one of the blocks. At the BS, all the provenance blocks
from the same provenance are aggregated to reconstruct the
entire provenance.
3.3.1 PN
Sultana et al. proposed the PN (Pseudo Noise Code)
provenance scheme [24] which encodes a large provenance
into a series of smaller binary blocks through pseudo noise
code and then transmits these binary blocks via inter-
packet delay channels. Moreover, the direct sequence
spread spectrum (DSSS) technique, an approach used for
enabling multiple users to transmit simultaneously on the
same frequency range by utilizing distinct PN [18], is used
to encode the node IDs along the packet path into the
provenance.
Under the PN scheme, each node uses a PN sequence of
LP bits to uniquely represent its ID. No matter how many
nodes in the provenance, the medium for provenance
transmission is a set of LP inter-packet delays (IPDs)
formed by LP þ 1 consecutive packets that transmit on the
same packet path. For an inter-packet delay transmitted
from the data source to the BS, every node in the packet
path only adds one bit from its PN sequence into the delay
sequentially. Therefore, assume that there are N nodes in a
packet path, when an inter-packet delay arrives at the BS, it
contains N bits. Thus, LP þ 1 packets, which form LP inter-
packet delays, will exactly transmit N  LP bits to the BS.
Because the PN sequences are orthogonal, even if each
delay contains N bits from N different nodes, by multi-
plying every node ID in the WSN and the received delays
together the BS can retrieve the node IDs in the packet
path.
It is worth noting that the PN scheme not only uses the
inter-packet delays as the media for the provenance, but
also uses them to protect both the security and the secrecy
of the provenance. The inter-packet delay channel is a side
channel in packet-switched networks, which uses different
delays between packets as the medium to carry mes-
sages [6], e.g., 5, 10, 15 and 20 ms represent binary blocks
00, 01, 10 and 11, respectively (see Fig. 2). At the other
side of the channel, the receiver filters the inter-packet
delays through the arrived packets and then retrieves the
encoded binary blocks. Because the inter-packet delays are
not normal media used to encode messages, such channels
can penetrate most network firewalls without being
noticed. Therefore, using inter-packet delays as the media
for the provenance allows one to hide the provenance
information. Furthermore, under the PN scheme, each node
in the packet path does not just encode one bit of its PN
sequence in the form of plain text because the corre-
sponding delay is generated by using the encryption key of
the node.
3.3.2 PPF
Fahmy et al. [2] proposed the PPF (Probabilistic Prove-
nance Flow) scheme which probabilistically incorporates
the node IDs in the packet path into the provenance, and
therefore each packet only carries a block of the prove-
nance to the BS. Consequently, the BS has to collect all the
blocks of a provenance for decoding, which makes such a
technique reminiscent of the PPM approach [9].
Under the PPM approach, each node along the packet
path makes an independent decision about whether to
append its ID to a passing by packet. The PPM approach
assumes that packet paths are static and that each packet
only contains one node ID. If there are N nodes from the
data source to the BS, at least N packets shall be involved
in provenance decoding. To save energy in WSNs, the PPF
Fig. 2 Different inter-packet delays represent different binary
information
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scheme probabilistically encodes a connected subgraph of
a packet transmission path into the packet instead of one
node ID only. Therefore, to decode such a provenance the
PPF scheme uses less than N packets when compared to the
PPM approach.
To probabilistically encode the subgraph of a packet
transmission path into the packet, the PPM scheme uses
three different techniques: rank method, prime method and
Rabin fingerprints method.
(1) Rank method The rank method first juxtaposes all
node IDs in a line and then assigns each node a
rankðIDÞ according to the node’s position in the line.
Then, instead of embedding a node ID directly into a
packet, the rankðIDÞ of the node is embedded. In
WSNs, hexadecimal numbers with the same length
are typically used to represent node IDs, e.g.,
0  2501, 0  2502, etc. Furthermore, if a WSN
contains different types of nodes, they may not
always use the same approach to represent their node
IDs. As a result, by using the rank method the BS
can use natural numbers 0; 1; 2; . . . to represent these
nodes, and therefore the provenance size is com-
pressed. As the BS knows the bijection between a
node ID and its rankðIDÞ, the subgraphs carried by
each packet can be decoded.
(2) Prime method according to number theory, an
integer number greater than 1 can be uniquely
presented as the product of a series of prime
numbers. The prime method is motivated by the
idea of using prime numbers as node IDs and then
encoding a set of IDs through their multiplication
which can be uniquely factorized. However, prime
numbers multiplication incurs computational and
spatial overhead when the participating prime num-
bers become larger [2]. It is worth noting that prime
numbers are sparsely distributed with the natural
number increase on the number line, which shows
the infeasibility of directly using prime numbers as
node IDs in WSNs. As a trade off in the prime
numbers to represent node IDs, the prime method
encodes a sequence of node IDs, which compose the
subgraph of a packet path, by multiplying a series of
nearby prime numbers for their IDs and summing up
the corresponding offset values. The prime method’s
decoding requires knowing node orders, which can
be obtained by applying the rank method first, i.e.,
after a configurable period of time during which the
provenance is constructed using the rank method, the
prime method is then applied. Compared to the rank
method, the prime method achieves a higher prove-
nance compression ratio. Upon receiving a packet,
the BS has to first factor the product to retrieve all
the prime numbers and then has to traverse the
different decompositions of the offset values in their
sum to retrieve the node IDs in the subgraph being
encoded in the packet. When all the subgraphs are
retrieved, the entire provenance is reconstructed by
integrating all the subgraphs together.
(3) Rabin fingerprints method When using the prime
method, although only the nearby prime numbers for
node IDs in a packet path are multiplied, such a
product increases rapidly with the increase of the
number of nodes in a WSN as well as the number of
nodes in the subgraph being encoded into a packet.
As an alternative for the prime method, the Rabin
fingerprints method [16] uses a polynomial to rep-
resent a sequence of bits, noting that all node IDs of
an encoded subgraph also consist a sequence of bits.
For a sequence of bits n1; n2; . . .; nm, of length m, the
Rabin fingerprint is given by the following expres-
sion, where a and M are constant integers:
RFðn1; . . .; nmÞ ¼ ðn1am1 þ n2am2 þ . . . þ nmÞ
modM: ð1Þ
When the sequence of bits n1; n2; . . .; nm, which rep-
resents the subgraph being encoded into a packet, is
replaced by its Rabin fingerprints RFðn1; n2; . . .; nmÞ,
the provenance is compressed.
By sharing a and M between the nodes and the BS,
RFðn1; n2; . . .; nmÞ can be decoded as n1; n2; . . .; nm at
the BS, and therefore the subgraph carried by every
packet is retrieved. The entire provenance is then
obtained by integrating all the subgraphs together.
3.3.3 Pros and Cons
The block provenance scheme partitions a longer provenance
into a series of smaller blocks and then appends onlyone block
to a packet or an inter-packet delay. Because it can effectively
mitigate the provenance size explosion, the block provenance
scheme is probably the only one that can be applied in
extremely large-scale WSNs. However, if a provenance is
divided into N blocks, at least N þ 1 packets in the PN
scheme and N packets in the PPM scheme are required to be
transmitted in the same packet path, respectively.
The PN scheme has some additional advantages: (1) The
provenance is transmitted through a side channel of the
data packet transmission channel, and therefore no extra
data is appended to the packet, which saves energy during
transmission; (2) the provenance is protected with respect
to both security and secrecy. The disadvantage of the PN
scheme is its weak robustness. Because the network
transmission protocols are not designed to transmit the
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inter-packet delays, some normal packet transmission
events, e.g., packet loss, packet aggregation, etc., can dis-
able the inter-packet delay channels [3].
The Rabin fingerprints method has the best provenance
compression ratio, followed by the prime method and the
rank method. However, it is a computational intensive
method for the nodes in a packet path.
3.4 Lossy Provenance Compression Schemes
In order to further reduce the provenance size, lossy
provenance compression approaches have been proposed.
Although the node IDs on a packet path are all embedded,
the topology graph for those nodes is discarded or only
partially kept.
3.4.1 BFP
Shebaro et al. [21] proposed a lightweight secure prove-
nance scheme which we refer to as the BFP (Bloom Filter
Based Provenance) scheme.
A Bloom filter (BF, for short) is a simple space-efficient
randomized data structure for representing a set in order to
support membership queries [5]. The BF uses an array of
m bits and k independent hash functions for the proba-
bilistic representation of a set of items S ¼ fs1; s2; . . .; sng.
Initially all m bits in the array are set to 0.
To insert an element si 2 S into a BF, si is hashed with
all the k hash functions. Each hash function hi maps si
uniformly to a position within the range ½0;m 1 and then
the corresponding bit of that position in the array is
changed to 1. To query the membership of an item si within
S, si is hashed by the k hash functions to yield k positions; if
any of the corresponding bit in the array is 0, si 62 S.
Otherwise, either si 2 S or it is a false positive. Figure 3
shows an example of a BF’s encoding and decoding.
Let m be the BF size, k be the number of hash functions
and D be the maximum number of the elements in S. The
false positive probability is equal to that of getting 1 in all
the k array positions computed by the hash functions while
querying the membership of an element that was not
inserted in the BF, i.e., the probability is [17]:
FFP ¼ 1 1 1
m
 kD !k
 ð1 ekDm Þk: ð2Þ
Under the BFP scheme, each node in the packet path
encodes its ID into an array through the BF and then
appends the array to the passing by packet. Before the data
source node ID is encoded, all elements in the array are set
to 0. Upon reception of a packet, the BS tests every node in
the WSN to get the nodes in the packet path.
We refer to the BFP scheme as a lossy approach
because: (1) False positives may arise, i.e., some nodes not
in the packet path are possibly decoded as if they were in
the path; (2) just based on the recovered node IDs, the BS
is unable to recover the packet path’s topology, i.e., the
provenance graph.
In view of this, the block provenance schemes PN and
PPF are lossy schemes too. Under the PN scheme, the BS
knows the node IDs but not the topology of those nodes.
Under the PPF scheme, although the BS knows a series of
subgraphs, from the entire provenance graph one cannot
precisely determine if those subgraphs can legitimately
compose two or more different provenance graphs.
To reconstruct the entire provenance graph when the
BFP scheme is used, Sultana et al. [23] use a recursive
backtracking algorithm with the neighboring information
of nodes at the BS. Moreover, they chain the adjacent
packet sequence numbers together along the packet path to
detect provenance forgery and packet dropping attacks. We
believe that such a method is applicable to the PPF
scheme too, where the PPF needs to integrate the subgraphs
instead of the node IDs to reconstruct the provenance.
3.4.2 Pros and Cons
Because the topology for the provenance graph is not
included (in the PN, BFP schemes) or only partially
included (in the PPF scheme), lossy schemes can achieve a
higher provenance compression ratio. Furthermore, as the
entire topology is not included, energy is saved at every
node.
Although the topology can be reconstructed through a
recursive backtracking algorithm and the neighboring
information of the nodes at the BS, such an algorithm is
computationally intensive and time consuming. In a real-
time system, it may negatively affect the data trustwor-
thiness evaluation.
Fig. 3 An example of a Bloom Filter. The filter begins as an array of
all 0s. Each item in the set si is hashed k times, with each hash
yielding a bit location; these bits are set to 1. To check if an element
sx is in the set, hash it k times and check the corresponding bits. The
element sx cannot be in the set, since a 0 is found at one of the bits.
The element sy is either in the set or the filter has yielded a false
positive
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3.5 Lossless Provenance Compression Schemes
Lossless provenance compression schemes encode the
entire provenance graph into a single packet at every node
in the packet path.
Because provenance size expands rapidly with the
increase of the packet transmission hops, the lossless
provenance compression schemes require efficient encod-
ing approaches to mitigate the expansion.
3.5.1 ACP
Hussain et al. [11] proposed an arithmetic coding-based
provenance (ACP) scheme. Unlike most of the provenance
schemes, its provenance size for a packet is not directly
proportional to the number of packet transmission hops, but
to the occurrence probability of the packet path in the
WSN. For instance, consider two packet paths pp1 and pp2
that include K1 and K2 nodes and assume that the occur-
rence probabilities of pp1 and pp2 are P1 and P2, respec-
tively. If P1[P2, even if K1  K2, the provenance size of
pp1 is smaller than that of pp2.
Arithmetic coding is a lossless data compression tech-
nique which achieves a compression ratio at most one bit
longer than the compressed file’s entropy [26, 28].
According to Shannon’s theory, the entropy of a file is the
upper bound of the file’s lossless compression. Each
codeword in arithmetic coding is a half-open subinterval of
the half-open unit interval [0.0, 1.0), where each subin-
terval’s length is proportional to its codeword’s occurrence
probability in the file to be compressed.
Figure 4 shows an example of arithmetic coding’s pro-
cedure. Assume that a message only contains three sym-
bols, a, d, i, and that their occurrence probabilities are 0.4,
0.4, and 0.2, respectively. Suppose that we need to encode
a new message aid composed by those three symbols. The
encoding procedure starts by dividing the half-open unit
interval [0, 1) into three half-open subintervals: [0.0, 0.4)
for a, [0.4, 0.8) for d, and [0.8, 1.0) for i. As a is the first
node on the path, its interval [0.0, 0.4) is further divided
into three subintervals [0.0, 0.16), [0.16, 0.32), and
[0.32, 0.4), where the ratios of the new subintervals are the
same as the original occurrence probabilities of the sym-
bols. Subsequently, to encode i, the corresponding interval
[0.32, 0.4) is selected and then further divided into
[0.32, 0.352), [0.352, 0.384), and [0.384, 0.4) using the
same ratio mentioned above. Finally, the last symbol d falls
into interval [0, 616, 0.648) and thereby the aid is repre-
sented as [0.352, 0.384) through arithmetic coding.
The arithmetic coding decoder recovers a message from
an interval [a, b), where 0 a; b 1, through a procedure
similar to that of the encoder. The decoder begins with the
unit half-open interval [0.0, 1.0) and divides it into the
same subintervals as the encoder. The first symbol is
recovered by locating the subinterval in which the desti-
nation interval [a, b) resides. The subinterval is further
divided in the same manner to recover the subsequent
symbols. The procedure terminates when the current
interval is equal to [a, b). for details about arithmetic
coding, we refer the readers to [20, 26].
In a WSN, according to a node’s occurrence probability
among all the used packet paths the ACP scheme assigns
each node a global cumulative probability. Furthermore, the
conditional probability is computed for each pair of con-
nected nodes. Such conditional probabilities are used to
generate the cumulative probabilities for the directed edges
in the provenance graph. Given a packet path in a WSN, the
ACP scheme uses the global cumulative probability of the
data source as the first coding interval, and then uses the
cumulative probabilities derived from the conditional
probabilities for all connected node pairs to generate the
provenance through arithmetic coding’s encoding algorithm.
Under the ACP scheme, the provenance is represented by a
subinterval of [0.0, 1.0). With the same global cumulative
probabilities for nodes and the same conditional probabilities
for node pairs, the provenance can be decoded at the BS
through arithmetic coding’s decoding algorithm.
3.5.2 DP
In the past for a long time, people thought that a file’s
entropy is the upper bound for the file’s lossless com-
pression until the dictionary-based approach [33] was
proposed.
The dictionary-based approach scans a file, in the form
of a symbol string, for sequences of symbols occurring
Fig. 4 An example of an arithmetic coding. The occurrence
probabilities of a, d, i are 0.4, 0.4, 0.2 respectively; the cumulative
occurrence probabilities assigned to a, d, i are [0.0, 0.4), [0.4, 0.8),
and [0.8, 1.0). The arithmetic coding interval for aid is then
[0.352, 0.384)
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multiple times, and then these sequences of symbols are
indexed and stored in a dictionary. Subsequently, the
compressed file is generated by replacing the repetitive
sequences of symbols with their indices. When a file con-
tains long repetitive sequences of symbols, the length of
the compressed file can be even smaller than the file’s
entropy.
Wang et al. [27] proposed a dictionary-based prove-
nance encoding (DP) scheme which treats each node ID as
a symbol and a packet path is then a symbol string. As a
result, the dictionary-based compression approach can be
applied to encode the provenances in WSNs.
Because no loop on a packet path is allowed, there is no
repetitive sequence of symbol on a packet path. As a result,
the DP scheme uses the past packet paths to generate the
dictionary.
It is worth noting that each node has a dictionary of
itself and the BS keeps the dictionary of every node in the
WSN. Thus, the provenance can be encoded distributively
at each node and centrally decoded at the BS by looking up
those dictionaries. Table 1 shows the dictionary generated
at each node using the two packet paths hn10n8n7n4n2BSi
and hn9n5n3n1BSi in Fig. 5. After the dictionary in Table 1
has been built at each node and shared with the BS, the new
packet path hn10n8n7n6n5n3n1BSi can be compressed as
hðn10; n7Þn6ðn5; n1ÞBSi. After such a packet path has been
stored in the dictionaries, it can be further compressed as
hðn10; n1ÞBSi.
3.5.3 Pros and Cons
Because the entire provenance graph is encoded into a
single packet, the lossless provenance compression
schemes are more robust compared to the block
provenance schemes and the distributed provenance
schemes. Moreover, the lossless provenance compression
schemes generate a moderate average provenance size.
The ACP scheme needs a training phase in order to
assign the occurrence probability to each node. If the
occurrence probabilities are not accurate, the compressed
provenance size will deviate from the optimum size that
can be achieved by arithmetic coding. Furthermore, the
ACP scheme requires transmitting two real numbers to
define the coding interval, which expands the provenance
size.
Although the DP scheme can compress a provenance to
a size which is even smaller than the provenance’s entropy,
such a property only holds when the topology of the WSN
is relatively stable, because in a WSN with unsta-
ble topology the packet path dictionaries are difficult to
build. In the worst case, if no packet can reuse a past packet
path, the provenance encoded by the DP scheme is not
compressed at all.
4 Provenance Security
As provenance is a key factor for data trustworthiness
evaluation in WSNs, it needs to be protected.
4.1 Security Requirements
Key security requirements for provenance are: confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability.
Provenance confidentiality requires that from observing
data packets and their associated provenance, it is com-
putationally infeasible for attackers to gain information
about nodes and their topology in the provenance.
Provenance integrity can be further categorized as origin
integrity and data integrity. Origin integrity requires that a
data packet cannot reuse a provenance from one of other
Table 1 Dictionaries generation at each node for the two packet
paths hn10n8n7n4n2BSi and hn9n5n3n1BSi in Fig. 5, where the index
for a packet path snippet is composed of the first and the last node IDs
of the packet path snippet
Node ID Packet path Path index
n10 hn10i ðn10; ;Þ
n8 hn10n8i ðn10; n8Þ
n7 hn10n8n7i ðn10; n7Þ
n4 hn10n8n7n4i ðn10; n4Þ
n2 hn10n8n7n4n2i ðn10; n2Þ
n6 hn6i ;
n9 hn9i ðn9; ;Þ
n5 hn9n5i ðn9; n5Þ
n3 hn9n5n3i ðn9; n3Þ
n1 hn9n5n2n1i ðn9; n1Þ
Fig. 5 Packet path dictionaries generation through the past packet
paths hn10n8n7n4n2BSi and hn9n5n3n1BSi
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packets as its own provenance without being detected by
the BS. Data integrity requires that an attacker or a set of
colluding attackers cannot selectively add or remove nodes
from the provenance generated by benign nodes without
being detected by the BS. It is worth noting that some
approaches [23, 24] use the notion of provenance freshness
instead of provenance origin integrity. In fact, these two
notions have the same connotation.
Provenance availability requires that the BS can use the
provenance information of interest with reasonable com-
putational costs. Provenance availability is important for
data trustworthiness evaluation, because the evaluation
only can be performed if the BS is able to gather the
provenance information with affordable computational
costs. In view of this, as Sultana et al. [23] use a compu-
tational intensive backtracking algorithm to reconstruct the
provenance, its availability is weaker compared to the
provenance schemes that can reconstruct the provenance
with lower computational costs.
4.2 Provenance Binding
To prevent unauthorized modifications, except for the
elementary provenance schemes using MAC (message
authentication code) to encode provenance, the other
provenance schemes have to bind the data and the prove-
nance through additional MACs. Consequently, if either
the provenance or the data are tampered, the BS is able to
detect such an unauthorized modifications.
The most common MAC approaches for assuring the
integrity of data are based on cryptographic hash functions,
such as MD5 and SHA-1. Assuming that we apply these
MAC approaches, the binding of data generated by MD5 or
SHA-1 will contribute 128 bits or 160 bits to the prove-
nance size at each node respectively, which is very
expansive for resource-tightened WSNs.
To address such issues, a distributed message digest
scheme, the AM-FM sketch scheme [7] with adjustable
output length relating to the false positive rate has been
adopted in recent provenance schemes [11, 22, 23, 27]. The
AM-FM sketch scheme prevents the binding data’s size from
growing beyond the range ½ð1 Þk; ð1þ Þ2 with proba-
bility 1 d, where k is the sample size of the provenance;
0\d\1 and \1 are the false positive and false negative
rates related to k assuming thatOðk	 logð2=dÞ2 Þ. Furthermore,
when distributively computing the digital digest, the AM-
FM scheme also uses a symmetric encryption based digital
signature approach at each node to protect the provenance.
As most compressed MAC schemes have false posi-
tives [4], only with a certain statistical confidence we can
assume that unauthorized provenance modification can be
detected by using the AM-FM sketch.
5 Future Work
Although the provenance for a packet only records the
packet’s forwarding and aggregation information, the
average provenance size expands with the increases of the
packet transmission hops and the amount of nodes in a
WSN. Even if several different encoding techniques have
been proposed, when dealing with extra large-scale WSNs,
these schemes suffer from the following shortcomings: (1)
Querying each node to retrieve a packet’s provenance in an
extra large-scale WSN is not only time consuming, but also
the broadcast flooding can deplete the battery on every
node; the distributed provenance schemes suffer from this
shortcoming; (2) using the neighboring information of each
node and a recursive backtracking algorithm at the BS to
recover the provenance graph is an NP-complete problem
when the WSN has a large amount of nodes; the lossy
provenance schemes suffer from this shortcoming; (3)
integrating all provenance blocks of the same packet to
recover the provenance requires that all the provenance
blocks are transmitted on the same packet path; the block
provenance schemes are not robust enough to deal with a
large number of packet transmission hops; (4) even if the
compression methods can mitigate the provenance size’s
expansion, in an extra large-scale WSN the compressed
provenance’s size will exceed the capacity of a packet very
likely and then the lossless provenance compression
schemes do not work properly.
The shortcomings of the elementary provenance
schemes are deliberately not discussed because even for a
WSN of moderate size, such schemes are not suitable be-
cause their provenance size expands too fast to be trans-
mitted through wireless channels.
To address such shortcomings, a promising approach is
based on an incremental resolution provenance scheme,
which reconstructs the provenance from a coarse-grained
provenance graph to the fine-grained ones. Such a prove-
nance scheme combines the block provenance methods and
the lossless provenance compression methods. When the
provenance of a smaller size can be appended to a single
packet, the number of the provenance block is equal to one,
i.e., the incremental resolution provenance scheme be-
comes a lossless provenance compression scheme. When
the provenance is large and cannot be appended to a single
packet, the provenance will be transmitted as a series of
blocks, where the first block contains the coarse-grained
provenance graph and the following sequences of blocks
contain the incremental information for retrieving the fine-
grained information about the provenance graph.
Under such a scheme, the BS does not need to wait for
all the provenance blocks to be received properly in order
to start decoding. The BS can incrementally reconstruct the
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provenance graph from the coarse-grained one to the fine-
grained ones until the precise provenance graph is recon-
structed. Even if some provenance blocks are lost during
transmission, the BS can decode the provenance at a cer-
tain granularity, and therefore assess the data trustworthi-
ness at such a granularity.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have surveyed the main approaches to
encode provenance in WSNs. Special attention has been
devoted to a systematic and comprehensive classification
of the solutions proposed in the literature. As to the five
different kinds of provenance schemes identified in the
paper, it is difficult to determine which one is always better
than the others. Each kind of scheme has its own appli-
cation scenarios. The elementary provenance schemes are
the simplest to implement in small-scale WSNs. The dis-
tributed provenance schemes store provenance information
at both the nodes in the packet path and the nearby nodes of
the packet path, and therefore do not transmit the prove-
nance with the corresponding packet. If the WSN is located
in a protected environment and the BS rarely needs to
verify the received data, such schemes are good choices.
The block provenance schemes are able to transmit
provenance of large size through a series of provenance
blocks. Such schemes are the only ones that do not suffer
from the packet capacity overload problem. The lossy
provenance compression schemes can achieve very high
compression ratio at the cost of discarding the topology of
the provenance graph. Moreover, in a sparse WSN (the
matrix for the WSN’s topology graph is a sparse one) or a
WSN with a small number of nodes, the topology can be
retrieved through a recursive backtracking algorithm based
on information on the node neighbors. The lossless
provenance compression schemes append the entire
provenance to each single packet; these schemes are thus
the most robust when compared with the other provenance
schemes.
We also discussed novel approaches based on the
incremental resolution provenance schemes. As a combi-
nation of the block provenance schemes and the lossless
provenance compression schemes, such provenance
schemes could outperform the other provenance schemes
with respects to both provenance compression ratio and
provenance decoding efficiency.
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